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Social Norms and Unthinkable Options 
Abstract:  We sometimes violate social norms in order to express our views and to trigger public 
debates.  Many extant accounts of social norms don’t give us any insight into this phenomenon.  
Drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s work, I am putting forward an empirical hypothesis that helps us to 
understand such norm violations.  The hypothesis says, roughly, that we often adhere to norms 
because we are systematically blind to norm-violating options.  I argue that this hypothesis is 
independently plausible and has interesting consequences.  It implies, e.g., that some experimental 
paradigms for investigating social norms have hitherto unnoticed shortcomings. 
Institutionalized norms constrain people’s 
behavior by making some lines of action 
unthinkable. 
(Newman 2008, p. 103) 
1. Introduction 
There is a debate about why we adhere to social norms as much as we do.  Some authors 
claim that norm compliance is motivated by self-interest (Binmore 2007, p. 9, 2010); 
others think that compliance with social norms can only be explained by a special kind of 
motivation, sometimes called “social preference” (Bicchieri 2006, p. 52; Camerer and Fehr 
2004).  Some theorists focus on the role of external sanctions, like punishment, in the 
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motivation of norm compliance (Axelrod 1986); others think that internalized sanctions, 
like feelings of guilt and shame, are more important (Elster 2009). 
The converse question is raised much more rarely:  When we disobey social norms, 
why do we do it?  The explanations for norm adherence just cited suggest an answer: 
sometimes we violate norms in order to maximize our personal payoff, we don’t care about 
the payoffs of others, and neither the external nor the internal sanctions are sufficient to 
deter us.  While such scenarios are lamentably familiar, there are norm violations that don’t 
fit this description.  As Paternotte and Grose (2013, p. 581) have pointed out: 
To not respect a norm may signal one’s disregard for group traditions […].  I can follow a norm 
(or not) because I want to see myself as a norm follower or as a maverick.  […T]he very fact that 
a behavioural rule is perceived as a norm may influence the way people comply with it […]. 
In fact, norm violations can have a social and expressive function.  They can be acts of 
political and cultural activism and a way of expressing one’s views and attitudes.  Let’s 
call such norm violations “social-expressive norm violations.” 
In this paper, I shall argue, first, that many accounts of social norms (when interpreted 
realistically) have difficulties explaining social-expressive norm violations and, second, 
that we can explain such norm violations if we focus on cognitive (rather than 
motivational) mechanisms that underlie some cases of norm adherence.  For the second 
claim I will draw on Cristina Bicchieri’s work on the role of scripts and schemata in norm 
adherence.  In particular, I put forward and lay the conceptual groundwork for the 
hypothesis that norm adherence is sometimes the result of cognitive mechanisms that 
 3 
exclude norm-violating options from practical deliberation.1  I call such mechanisms 
“Option Limiting Mechanisms” (OLMs) and the hypothesis just mentioned the “OLM 
Hypothesis.”  If the OLM Hypothesis is true, it has important consequences.  For one, it 
means that accounts of social norms should not focus exclusively on motivation; cognition 
is more important than is sometimes assumed.  Moreover, if the OLM Hypothesis is 
correct, many experimental paradigms that are used to investigate social norms have 
unrecognized limitations because they interfere with OLMs. 
The paper is structured as follows:  In Section 2, I sketch some extant accounts of 
social norms.  I go on, in Section 3, to argue that these accounts have difficulties 
explaining social-expressive norm violations (under a realistic interpretation).  In 
Section 4, I introduce the OLM Hypothesis and say why it is plausible.  I then explain, in 
Section 5, how the OLM Hypothesis can account for social-expressive norm violations.  In 
Section 6, I point out some interesting consequences of the OLM hypothesis, and Section 7 
considers some potential objections. 
2. Some Extant Accounts of Social Norms 
In this section, I sketch some prominent accounts of social norms and why people comply 
with them.  In the next section, I will raise a problem for these accounts. 
Much of the recent debate about social norms focuses on the question what motivates 
people to comply with social norms.  Some game theorists think that compliance with 
                                                 
1 Hence the title of this paper.  Note that my use of “unthinkable” in the title differs from Frankfurt’s 
(1988) use of the term.  For Frankfurt, an action is unthinkable if the agent cannot bring herself to do it.  For 
me, an option is unthinkable if there is a mechanism that excludes it from deliberation.  I agree with 
Frankfurt, however, that facts about what is unthinkable partly constitute the practical and social identities of 
agents. 
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social norms “mostly results in our coordinating on efficient equilibria in the real-life 
games that we play every day with those around us” (Binmore 2007, p. 9).  This might be 
taken to suggest that narrowly conceived self-interest is typically enough to motivate norm 
adherence.  Contrary to this idea, some authors regard it as essential to norms that norm-
governed behavior differs from behavior motivated solely by self-interest (McAdams and 
Rasmusen 2007, p. 1575).  Social norms are, e.g., often distinguished from conventions, 
i.e. social phenomena that allow agents to solve coordination problems (see Bicchieri 
2006, pp. 34-42).  Similarly, Jon Elster thinks that a special kind of motivation is at work 
in norm adherence: norms are “sustained by the internalized emotion of shame” (Elster 
1999, p. 146; see also 2009, pp. 196-199, 1989, p. 113).2  Cristina Bicchieri (2006, p. 11) 
is more specific about the structure of the relevant motivation.  On her view, it is a 
conditional preference:3 a behavioral rule is a social norm in a population if enough people 
know the rule and prefer to conform to it on the condition that enough others also conform 
and expect others to conform. 
All these accounts involve a view about what normally motivates people to adhere to 
social norms.  It is, thus, natural to think that what explains norm violations must be 
something that undercuts, counteracts, or interferes with this motivation.  Perhaps the agent 
thinks, e.g., that she won’t be too ashamed of violating the norm (on Elster’s view), or she 
believes that most people violate the rule (on Bicchieri’s view), or she realizes that she is 
                                                 
2 Some distinctions that are worth mentioning are irrelevant for my current purposes.  Elster and Bicchieri, 
e.g., distinguish social norms from legal norms by pointing out that legal norms are codified and enforced by 
people who have a special duty to do so (see Elster 2009, p. 197; Bicchieri 2006, p. 8).  It is also common to 
distinguish social norms from moral norms.  Elster, e.g., holds that moral norms are sustained by feelings of 
guilt whereas social norms are sustained by feelings of shame (Elster 2009, p. 196). 
3 A special feature of Bicchieri’s concept of a social norm is that it allows for so-called “pluralistic 
ignorance,” i.e., the possibility that a social norm for doing A exists while the majority (or even all) of the 
members of the population in which the norm exists do not disapprove of not doing A (but erroneously think 
that a sufficiently large subset of the population does disapprove of not doing A) (Bicchieri 2006, p. 14). 
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playing a game where norm adherence does not maximize her payoff (on Binmore’s view), 
etc. 
I hasten to add that the authors I have cited are not committed to these views.  After 
all, some proponents of extant accounts don’t see themselves as making claims about what 
happens in people’s minds when they are following norms (see Paternotte and Grose 
2013).  Rather, they see themselves as providing a rational reconstruction of behavior 
(Bicchieri 2006) or an evolutionary explanation (Binmore 2010).  I am interested, 
however, in an explanation of norm adherence and norm violations in terms of what goes 
on in the subjects’ minds.  So let’s begin by interpreting the preferences and beliefs that 
these accounts posit in a psychologically realistic way.  And let’s see what we can say, on 
such a realistic interpretation, about social-expressive norm violations. 
3. Social-Expressive Norm Violations 
There are norm violations that are not performed because of the (narrowly conceived) 
advantages that they bring about for the agent.  Sometimes people violate norms in order to 
create a public debate about norms (Benski 2005).4  They want to “make a statement,” to 
express their views, and ultimately they want to change the society in which they live.  
Especially if many people follow a norm uncritically and thoughtlessly, violating a norm in 
                                                 
4 I don’t think that Benski’s example (a case of political activism in Israel) should be explained in terms of 
the OLM hypothesis I shall present below.  However, it illustrates the use of what she calls “breaching 
events” by social movements.  OLMs are one mechanism among others that can be exploited in such 
“breaching events.”  Compare also Judith Butler’s (1990) discussion of drag.  The other side of the same coin 
is, I think, that OLMs can underlie structural explanations (see Haslanger 2015). 
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public can be an effective way to shake up society.  What do the accounts sketched in the 
previous section have to say about such social-expressive norm violations?5 
Let’s consider an example:  When young males first began to wear long hair in the 
1960s, there existed (I take it) a social norm against this.6  Why did these young people 
violate the norm?  Was it self-interest that motivated these people?  Did they violate the 
norm, e.g., because they found it aesthetically pleasing to wear long hair?  Because they 
did not want to pay for a haircut?  Maybe, but why were these advantages not outweighed 
by the many problems these people encountered (e.g. problems with finding a job, etc.)?  
The obvious answer is that these people wanted to “make a statement,” they wanted to 
trigger a public debate about the values and social norms of their society. 
It is easy for a game-theoretic account to explain why someone, e.g., defects in a 
prisoner’s dilemma and, thereby, violates a social norm:  The subject maximizes her payoff 
— or alternatively her utility (and her utility-function does not assign a high enough utility 
to obeying the norm).7  But in the case of the hippies’ long hair the individual’s payoff (i.e. 
aesthetic pleasure, savings because of fewer visits to the hairdresser, etc.) does not seem to 
be the crucial factor in a good explanation.  Someone might reply that what really explains 
why they were wearing long hair was their desire to be accepted by their friends.8  Maybe 
this is true for a lot of cases, but it does not explain why wearing long hair was required for 
                                                 
5 Paternotte and Grose (2013, pp. 581-584) have pointed out a related problem with traditional accounts of 
social norms, e.g., in the passage quoted above.  However, Paternotte and Grose are not interested in the 
social effects that violations of norms as such might have. 
6 Notice that this rule was a genuine norm and not a mere convention.  For people expected men to wear 
short hair, i.e., what Bicchieri calls “normative expectations” were present in this case.  The same holds for 
the example of the generic pronoun below. 
7 On Bicchieri’s account this would mean that the parameter ki in the agent’s utility function — which 
“represents a player’s sensitivity to the relevant norm” (Bicchieri 2006, p. 52) — is too small to keep the 
agent from defecting. 
8 Smith, Thomas and McGarty (2014) have offered an account of such phenomena in new social 
movements.  They argue that agreement on new social norms can lead to new social identities. 
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being accepted or how the trend began in the first place.  Some people must have started 
the whole thing.  Why did those people wear long hair and, thereby, violate the social 
norm? 
To this a game-theorist might reply:  “Of course, the hippies wore long hair because 
they wanted to create a public debate about social norms etc.  But that just means that these 
people had a preference for the existence of certain debates.”  This is a perfectly good 
answer, but it does not tell us why the violation of social norms should lead to a public 
debate about these norms.  If game-theoretic models can explain how social norms 
influence our actions, they should have something to say about how and why the violation 
of social norms can be used to “make statements” and trigger debates. 
According to Bicchieri’s account, one can undermine a social norm by undermining 
the expectation of a sufficiently large subset of people in the relevant group or population 
that a sufficiently large subset of the people in the relevant group or population will act in 
accordance with the norm (Bicchieri 2006, p. 11).  So, Bicchieri’s account can explain why 
someone who wants to undermine a social norm would want to get a lot of people to 
violate the norm in public.  Undermining a social norm by changing the expectations of 
people is not, however, the same as triggering a public debate.  Changing the expectations 
of people is, on Bicchieri’s account, a matter of changing people’s beliefs about whether a 
norm is in force.  But the hippies, I take it, did not want to persuade people that certain 
norms were not in force; they wanted to convince people that the existing norms should not 
be in force.  According to Bicchieri’s account, wearing long hair should make people 
believe that there really does not exist any norm against wearing long hair.  I think quite 
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the contrary is true:  After the hippies started to wear long hair, people became more, rather 
than less, aware of the fact that there was a norm against it. 
According to Elster’s view, we should expect that the primary emotional reaction of 
people to hippies wearing long hair was contempt and that the primary emotional reaction 
to this contempt on the side of the hippies was a feeling of shame (Elster 2009, p. 197).  
This doesn’t seem right, at least for the emotional reaction of the hippies.  Regarding the 
reaction of the other people, the question arises:  Why should the hippies have wanted to 
produce contempt in them?  Given that the hippies grew their hair long in order to trigger a 
public debate and to “make a statement,” how can this be done by producing contempt?  
Of course, one can tell a story about how producing contempt might lead to a social strain, 
which in turn might lead to a public debate.  But that story is in no way entailed by Elster’s 
account. 
Notice that the hippies’ motivation that trumped their potential motivation to adhere to 
the norm was not independent of that very norm.  They wouldn’t have felt so strongly 
about their hair if there hadn’t been a norm against wearing long hair.  How can norms 
play this role?  None of the accounts we have looked at gives us much insight into why 
social norms lend themselves to social-expressive norm violations. 
Let’s consider another example: the use of the generic female pronoun.  Traditionally 
there was a norm, to use “he” as the generic pronoun, as in “When someone asks you, tell 
him.”  With the rise of feminism, some people started to use “she” as a generic pronoun.  
Such norm violations were not only intended to “put things right.”  At least initially, they 
were also meant to trigger a debate about gender inequality.  By using the female generic 
pronoun you could express a view and take a side in the struggle for women’s liberation. 
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Here again it is implausible that those who began using “she” as a generic pronoun did 
so (solely) because of the practical advantages,9 the desire to generate contempt in their 
audience, or a plan to undermine the empirical expectations that others follow the norm.  
They did it, at least in part, in order to put an alternative on the table.  And putting an 
alternative on the table expresses a view and can trigger a debate about the violated norm. 
As with the hippies’ long hair, the motivation for violating the norm is not independent 
of the existence of the norm.  What is going on in social-expressive norm violations?  The 
realistic interpretations of the accounts mentioned in the previous section don’t give us 
much insight into such cases.  It is hard to see, on such accounts, why something being a 
norm can motivate you to violate that very norm. 
4. The OLM Hypothesis 
In order to get a better understanding of social-expressive norm violations, we should 
reject the realistic interpretation of the beliefs and preferences that figure in the accounts 
mentioned in Section 2.  It is worth taking a closer look at the cognitive mechanisms that 
can lead to norm adherence.  Drawing on Cristina Bicchieri’s (2006, pp. 81-99) work on 
the role of scripts and schemata in norm adherence, I want to suggest an empirical 
hypothesis about how norms can sometimes influence behavior. 
Option Limiting Mechanism (OLM) Hypothesis 
Some cases of norm adherence are explained by 
                                                 
9 There actually are practical advantages if one uses both pronouns as generic pronouns: certain 
ambiguities can be avoided.  The sentence “For everyone who thinks that he is better than everyone else, 
there is someone who is better and he loves him,” e.g., is ambiguous in a way that the sentence “For everyone 
who thinks that he is better than everyone else, there is someone who is better and she loves him” is not. 
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OLM-H1 cognitive mechanisms (involving scripts and schemata) that 
eliminate norm-violating options from the set of options an agent 
considers in practical deliberation, 
OLM-H2 where the presence of these mechanisms in the agent is explained by 
the existence of the social norm whose violations are filtered out. 
The idea is this: options become available to an agent in deliberation by a subpersonal, 
two-stage process.  The result of the first stage is a set of options that is not yet filtered 
with respect to norm-conformity.  An OLM operates on the result of this first stage and 
filters out the norm-violating options.  The result of this second stage then becomes 
available for deliberation.  Both stages of this process are subpersonal, automatic 
processes.10 
Before we proceed, six points of clarification are in order:  First, the norms for which it 
is most plausible that they are sustained by OLMs are what we may call “internalized 
norms.”  By this I mean norms that have become a matter of course for us; we rarely think 
about them, and acting in accordance with them has become second nature to us.  These 
are typically norms that also structure the way we perceive our social environment and that 
can easily trigger emotions in us.11  Many norms concerning how to eat, dress, interact and 
talk are internalized in this sense.  The norms I have in mind in putting forward the OLM 
Hypothesis are of this kind.  After all, it seems too easy to become aware of the option of 
                                                 
10 They probably belong to what is sometimes called “System 1” (Kahneman 2011). 
11 The OLM Hypothesis can contribute to an understanding of what it means that such norms structure the 
perception of our social environment.  After all, OLMs change the options we are aware of, and these options 
typically involve particular interactions with our social surroundings. 
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violating norms that are not internalized (although it is ultimately an empirical question 
which norms, if any, are adhered to because of OLMs). 
Second, I want to block a worry about computational plausibility: an OLM does not 
need to go through all the norm-violating options.  An OLM operates on the results of the 
first stage of the two-stage process just sketched and is, hence, not computationally 
implausible. 
Notice, thirdly, that the OLM Hypothesis is not the trivial claim that we sometimes 
follow norms because we don’t consider the option of violating them.  Rather, the idea is 
that this happens in a systematic way that is explained by the existence of the norm itself.  
The OLM Hypothesis says neither that whenever you don’t do something because you 
don’t consider doing it you are adhering to a norm against doing it, nor that whenever you 
follow a norm you don’t consider the option of violating it.12  The OLM Hypothesis is an 
empirical hypothesis about one way among others in which norms influence behavior. 
Fourth, it is worth pointing out that subpersonal mechanisms that limit the options that 
an agent considers probably also play an important role in domains that have nothing to do 
with social norms (more on this below).  The OLMs that I am interested in are, however, 
specific to social norms because they filter out norm-violating options and their existence 
depends on social norms. 
Fifth, I want to stress that my aim here is to lay the conceptual groundwork for the 
OLM Hypothesis.  Establishing the truth of the OLM Hypothesis requires empirical 
                                                 
12 After all, there are cases in which it is utterly implausible to think that people comply with a norm 
because they do not consider violating it.  Practices like female genital cutting persist in some communities in 
Africa even after explicit efforts to change the relevant norms have been made and alternatives have been 
pointed out (see Bicchieri and Mercier 2014).  My hypothesis is not meant to apply to such cases.  It is 
implausible to assume that the same mechanism underlies all cases of norm compliance (Andrighetto et al. 
2014), and I am making a proposal about one such mechanism. 
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research; this goes beyond the theoretical philosophical work I can do here.  For now, all I 
want to claim is that the OLM Hypothesis is a coherent, interesting and plausible 
hypothesis that has explanatory power. 
Finally, I want to be clear that the OLM Hypothesis is not an account of social norms; 
it is not a rival to the accounts sketched in Section 2.  It is a claim about mechanisms that 
sometimes underlie norm adherence.  Nevertheless, a realistic interpretation of the accounts 
sketched in Section 2 is incompatible with the OLM Hypothesis.  After all, the OLM 
Hypothesis does not even mention preferences, and the accounts from Section 2 — 
realistically interpreted — explain norm adherence in terms of preferences. 
In the next two subsections, I will explain why the OLM Hypothesis is plausible.  I 
will discuss the two parts of the hypothesis, i.e. OLM-H1 and OLM-H2, in subsections 4.1 
and 4.2 respectively.  In subsection 4.3, I further clarify the OLM Hypothesis by 
suggesting ways in which it can be tested empirically.  In Section 5, I will then look at how 
the OLM Hypothesis helps us to understand social-expressive norm violations. 
4.1. Limiting the Space of Options 
Let’s think about OLM-H1.  The idea that there are cognitive mechanisms or states that 
exclude options from deliberation is not new.  In the philosophy of action, e.g., Michael 
Bratman (1987, p. 33) has argued that prior intentions and plans “narrow the scope of 
deliberation to a limited set of options” by providing “filter[s] of admissibility for options.”  
According to OLM-H1, a similar idea can be applied in some cases of norm adherence.13 
                                                 
13 Perhaps similar ideas can also be found in work on bounded rationality.  There are, however, also 
differences between OLMs and mechanisms that may underlie bounded rationality, such as satisficing 
(Simon 1956; Gigerenzer 2010; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009).  Both, OLMs and satisficing, reduce 
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Cristina Bicchieri (2006) has argued that the influence of norms on behavior is 
mediated by scripts.  In particular, she holds that which norm influences an agent’s 
behavior depends on how the agent interprets the situation, which in turn depends on what 
scripts are activated.  I agree, and I think that one way in which this happens is that script 
activation leads to the elimination of norm-violating options from deliberation.  Similar 
phenomena have been described in the literature on schema-based decision-making 
(Marshall and Seel 2012).  It is well-known, e.g., that in many cases of decision-making 
people with the relevant experience consider only a very limited number of options and 
these options are typically “good” ones (Klein 1995; Ross et al. 2004).14  Lipshitz and Ben 
Shaul (1997) have argued that this limitation of options is the result of the activation of 
schemata that leads to the formation of mental models, which in turn triggers the retrieval 
of a specific repertoire of available options from memory.  So there is evidence that 
schemata and scripts can influence the set of options an agent considers.  If Bicchieri is 
right and norm adherence is mediated by script activation, it is plausible that such 
limitations of options can sometimes explain norm compliance.15  An example from 
Garfinkel (1967) may illustrate this possibility.  Garfinkel asked students to bargain for 
standard priced merchandise.  There is a social norm against such attempts to bargain.  
This comes out in the fact that many students could not bring themselves to do it or felt 
uncomfortable.  However, “many students reported that they had learned to their ‘surprise’ 
                                                                                                                                                    
computational complexity compared to cognitive mechanisms that compute, e.g., which of all possible 
options maximizes utility.  On the other hand, OLMs reduce the number of options in the search space, 
whereas satisficing and most heuristics described within the bounded rationality framework introduce new 
rules for when to stop searching and for how to decide between the options in the search space. 
14 The examples that are most often used are the decisions of firefighters, military commanders, and chess 
players. 
15 One might further hypothesize that a neural mechanism like the one postulated by Antonio Damasio’s 
Somatic Marker Hypothesis is responsible for this exclusion of options (see Bechara 2011; Bechara and 
Damasio 2005). 
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that one could bargain in standard priced settings with some realistic chance of an 
advantageous outcome, and planned to do so in the future” (Garfinkel 1967, p. 69).  It 
seems plausible that these students did not consider the option of bargaining in standard 
price settings before participating in the study; the activation of a schema for standard price 
settings excluded this option from deliberation.16  Once they were aware of the option, 
however, they couldn’t see any reason for not choosing it.  Given OLM-H1, that is what 
we should expect. 
In light of this converging research in psychology, sociology and philosophy, it is 
plausible that when an internalized norm governs behavior in a certain kind of situation, 
the script that is activated by such situations can lead to the elimination of all norm-
violating options.  I.e., the combination of the mechanisms underlying schema activation, 
mental model formation and thereby influenced memory retrieval constitutes an OLM.  
Thus, the agent adheres to the norm because she does not consider violating it.  Whether an 
OLM is triggered depends on how the agent interprets the situation, i.e. on what scripts are 
activated.17  Thus, the cited research lends plausibility to OLM-H1. 
4.2. Putting OLMs in Place 
What about OLM-H2, i.e. the claim that norms can explain why OLMs are present in 
agents?  This point can be illustrated by looking at the upbringing of children.  The second 
part of the OLM Hypothesis implies that when we, e.g., teach our kids to eat using 
                                                 
16 Notice that I do not claim that the norm violations in Garfinkel’s study were social-expressive norm 
violations.  Not all violations of OLM-sustained norms are social-expressive norm violations. 
17 Given that schema theory has long been criticized for being too vague (e.g. Beers 1987; Alba and Hasher 
1983), it is desirable to specify — as I just did — the precise mechanism by which script activation leads to 
norm compliance. 
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silverware, to greet guests, or to say “please” when asking for something, this typically 
leads to an OLM in the kids. 
How can an upbringing in the context of social norms lead to OLMs?  We know from 
the work of Michael Tomasello and his colleagues that children have a tendency to 
spontaneously follow (and even create) norms and to interpret situations normatively 
(Göckeritz et al. 2014; Schmidt et al. 2012, 2011; Rossano et al. 2011; Wyman et al. 2009).  
Moreover, young children tend to use language that objectifies norms, i.e. language that 
presents the norm as an “unalterable fact,” e.g., “It works like this” rather than “You must 
do it like this” (Köymen et al. 2014).  Thus, children seem to conceive of norms as limits 
of their “space of agency” that are simply “out there.” 
Given this characteristically human motivation to comply with norms and potential 
sanctioning by adults, deliberating about the option of violating a given norm is cognitively 
costly and futile for children.  And it is costly and futile because a norm against these 
options exists.  The development of an OLM helps children to cut down on cognitive costs 
while focusing on the “good options.”  Once children adhere to the norm because of an 
OLM, this behavioral pattern tends to persist even without any sanctions because people 
who have acquired OLMs as children don’t consider the option of violating the norm.  This 
is in line with results from psychology showing that norm-compliance tends to persist even 
outside the circumstances that initially led to it.  As Sherif puts it, norms tend to “outlive 
their usefulness” (Sherif 1936, p. 198; see also Bicchieri 1990). 
These considerations lend plausibility to OLM-H2.  Not only can OLMs explain (some 
cases of) norm adherence, but it is plausible that norms can explain OLMs. 
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4.3. Empirical Testability of the OLM Hypothesis 
It can seem that the OLM Hypothesis is banal: of course, we don’t always consider every 
possible option, and this can explain why we are not choosing the options we are not 
considering.  Does the empirical content of the OLM Hypothesis go beyond this obvious 
fact?  Although I here merely want to lay the theoretical groundwork for the OLM 
Hypothesis and I’m not trying to establish its truth, the best way to bring out the empirical 
content of the hypothesis is to consider how it might be tested.  I think we should begin by 
testing the two parts of the OLM Hypothesis separately. 
First, we should test whether people sometimes comply with norms because they 
systematically fail to consider violating them (i.e. OLM-H1).  One way to approach this 
task is to ask:  How can we tell the difference between an option that is unavailable in 
deliberation due to an OLM and an option that is systematically much worse than other 
options?  There are two important differences.  First, options excluded by OLMs are more 
likely to be chosen if they are made salient to the agent.  Second, it is more difficult to alert 
a subject to an option that is excluded by an OLM than to alert her to an option that is 
merely much worse than the alternatives.  How could we test these predictions? 
One way of testing these predictions would be to take two different situations in which 
subjects are typically not aware of having a certain option and the option has a clear 
advantage over other options.  In one situation there is a norm against choosing the 
relevant option and the norm is plausibly sustained by OLMs;18 in the other situation there 
                                                 
18 As already intimated, OLMs are probably more important in cases of internalized norms than in other 
cases.  So the OLM Hypothesis should be primarily investigated with respect to such norms. 
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is no such norm.19  We manipulate the salience of the ignored option in both cases.  If 
OLM-H1 is correct, two things should happen.  First, as subjects become aware of the 
norm-violating option (due to its increased salience), norm compliance should go down.  
After all, the salience of the option should undermine the OLM.  Second, it should be more 
difficult to make people aware of the ignored option in the case where there is a norm 
against choosing the option than in the other case.  This reflects the fact that there is a 
difference between being unaware of an option because of an OLM and being unaware of 
an option where this is not the result of an OLM. 
The second part of the hypothesis, i.e. that norms can lead to OLMs (OLM-H2), is 
harder to test in the lab.  We would need to create “artificial” social norms and compare 
groups in which such a norm was created to other groups and check whether their 
awareness of the relevant options differ.  This might be difficult for at least two reasons:  
First, it might take time for a social norm to lead to an OLM.  Second, it is unclear whether 
we can create genuine social norms of the right kind (i.e. internalized norms that are 
plausibly sustained by OLMs) in the lab.20  So we will probably have to supplement such 
experiments with research in the field.  We could investigate, e.g., how the options that 
children deliberate about change as they start to comply with social norms.  If OLM-H2 is 
correct, their awareness of norm-violating options should decrease. 
These are, of course, very rough sketches of possible empirical studies.  I have left out 
many details.  For example, we would need to control for possible normative 
interpretations of making an option salient and motivational factors that contribute to norm 
                                                 
19 The second kind of situation should be unfamiliar to the agent in order to rule out that a mechanism like 
an OLM (that is not norm related) is also operative in this condition. 
20  Göckeritz et al. (2014) argue that norms can spontaneously develop in the lab.  One might doubt, 
however, that such norms can be internalized in the lab.  And it seems plausible that only internalized norms 
can be sustained by OLMs. 
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compliance.  Nevertheless, these sketches show that the OLM Hypothesis has testable 
empirical content.  And given that my aim here is to provide a novel theoretical 
perspective, this suffices for my present purposes. 
This relates to a prominent topic in the psychological literature: the salience of norms.  
We know that whether people behave in accordance with a social norm depends on the 
salience of the norm (for an overview over some of the literature see Bicchieri 2006, pp. 
63-70).  Cialdini et al. found, e.g., that subjects were significantly more likely to litter in an 
already littered environment in which they observed other people littering than in a clean 
environment or when they did not observe other people littering (Cialdini et al. 1991).  My 
hypothesis suggests a novel interpretation of these data.  In cases where OLMs are 
relevant, it is not so much the salience of a norm that influences behavior but rather the 
salience of the possibility of violating the norm.  If this possibility is made salient, that 
undermines the OLM.  If this interpretation of the data can be corroborated, this would 
lend empirical support to the OLM Hypothesis. 
5. OLMs and Social-Expressive Norm Violations 
How can the OLM Hypothesis help us to understand social-expressive norm violations?  If 
the fact that a group of people comply with a norm is explained by a socially shared OLM, 
these people comply with the norm because they don’t consider the option of violating it.  
If the norm is publically and saliently violated, however, it is difficult to “ignore” the 
option of violating the norm.  After all, humans can learn by observing others (Bandura 
and Walters 1963).  Hence, publically violating a norm that is sustained by OLMs will 
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force everyone to consider the option of violating the norm.  The norm becomes visible for 
everyone.  Once everyone is aware of the norm and the option of violating it, the norm can 
be thematized and questioned.21   The mere act of making it obvious that there are 
alternatives to norm adherence can put pressure on advocates of the norm to provide 
reasons for having the norm around.  Thus, social-expressive norm violations make sense 
if the norm violated is typically followed because of an OLM.  I am not claiming that this 
is the only role social-expressive norm violations can play, but I think it is plausible that 
they often do play the role just described. 
Let’s look at our examples from Section 3 again.  According to my view, hippies grew 
their hair long in order to make a statement of roughly the following kind:  “You, non-
hippies, do not realize how restricted you are by your social norms.  You do not realize that 
there are all these other ways one might dress; just as you do not realize that there are all 
these other ways one might live.  I will make you see all these other ways of doing things.”  
By making people aware of different ways of living, the hippies “forced” everyone to think 
about these options and, if people wanted to stick to their norms, to articulate reasons 
against choosing these options.  The social-expressive norm violations of the hippies 
enlarged the menu of options for everyone, and this made it possible to have a debate about 
all these options and the norms against some of them. 
Let’s turn to the example of the generic pronoun.  According to the OLM hypothesis, 
the way this works is this: people who internalized sexist norms of language-use did not 
even consider the option of using “she” as a generic pronoun.  The question did not arise 
for them.  When people started to use “she” in this way, it became obvious that this option 
                                                 
21 The feeling of surprise that results from realizing that there are more options than one had thought might 
be important for mobilization in new social movements (Scheff 2006; Jasper 2011). 
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exists (and many more, as the many proposals that are on the table today show).  One 
reason why this is a particularly effective way to trigger a debate is that it shows how 
widespread the unconscious influence of norms of gender inequality is.  And because 
people did not consider the alternative, they typically were not prepared to give reasons for 
preferring the old way of doing things. 
An opponent might say that such phenomena can be explained by saying that although 
people were aware of the norm-violating options, they were not aware that some people 
prefer not to follow the norm and can be motivated to violate it.  I find this implausible for 
the following reason:  If people considered violating the norm, they must have preferred to 
follow it.  Movements like the hippies and feminism, however, often made many people 
first realize that they do not prefer to follow the existing norms.  Creating the right kind of 
“consciousness” was (and is) on the agenda of such movements, and social-expressive 
norm violations are an important part of this.  Moreover, if such social-expressive norm 
violations did not focus on options that people were not previously aware of, they would 
probably be less effective.  After all, people would probably be prepared to give (non-
ridiculous) reasons for why one should follow the norm.  Furthermore, there are cases in 
which it seems implausible that people could think about the norm but not realize that 
many others would prefer not to follow it, e.g., norms of gender inequality. 
6. Consequences of the OLM Hypothesis 
I want to point out four interesting consequences of the OLM Hypothesis. 
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(i)  If the OLM Hypothesis is correct, cognitive mechanisms play a larger role in norm 
adherence than is sometimes assumed.  The OLM Hypothesis can explain some cases of 
norm adherence in a purely cognitive way; no preferences or motivations are mentioned in 
the explanation for why the agent complies with the norm.  Of course, creating and 
sustaining OLMs depends on motivational factors, and motivation may play a crucial role 
in many cases of norm compliance.  (And especially the fact that people typically 
disapprove of norm violations cannot be explained by the OLM Hypothesis.)  For some 
cases, however, OLMs can explain why someone complies with a norm without positing 
any special motivation (at the time of action) to comply with the norm. 
The reader might be puzzled how the OLM Hypothesis can be an elaboration of 
Bicchieri’s use of scripts and schemata, given that Bicchieri’s own account explains norm 
adherence in terms of preferences.22  Is it really possible to selectively accept only parts of 
Bicchieri’s view?  Part of the answer to this worry is that, as Bicchieri herself points out, 
her account in terms of preferences and utility is “not a faithful descriptive account of the 
real beliefs and preferences people have or of the way in which they in fact deliberate” 
(Bicchieri 2006, p. 3).  Rather, these considerations belong to a rational reconstruction that 
must be distinguished from the psychological account in terms of scripts.  A second part of 
the answer is that, while Bicchieri sees no tension between her account in terms of 
preferences and her account in terms of scripts, I think that the OLM Hypothesis brings out 
that there is at least a potential tension here.  After all, it is at least not immediately obvious 
how you can incorporate something like the OLM Hypothesis into a “rational 
                                                 
22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 
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reconstruction” in terms of preferences, i.e., how you could come to the same predictions 
as the OLM Hypothesis if you work only with beliefs and preferences. 
(ii)  If the OLM Hypothesis is true, many experimental paradigms that are used in the 
game-theoretic tradition are not a good way to investigate social norms, at least in cases 
where OLMs are relevant — pace Camerer and Fehr (2004).  For such experiments 
typically force subjects to choose between a few salient options.  Bicchieri and Chavez 
(2013), e.g., explained to each Proposer in an Ultimatum Game that she has exactly three 
options to divide her $10: 5/5, 8/2, or let a fair coin decide between the previous two 
options.  And we can suppose, for the sake of argument, that dividing the money unevenly 
violates a social norm.  Thus, typical game-theoretic experiments make the option of 
violating social norms salient to the subjects.  They thereby make it hard for subjects to 
deliberate in such a way that the question whether or not to violate the norm never arises.23 
(iii)  Most accounts of social norms have little to say about the phenomenology of 
acting in accordance with norms.  All that John Searle, e.g., has to say on this topic is that 
people acting in accordance with what he calls “constitutive rules” need not have any 
beliefs or desires regarding these rules (Searle 1995, p. 127).  Jon Elster (2009, p. 196) tells 
us a little bit more: 
                                                 
23 Since I don’t claim that OLMs are the only way in which social norms influence behavior, what I just 
said does not mean that traditional game-theoretic experiments cannot tell us anything interesting about 
social norms.  We have learned a lot from such experiments. 
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[T]he operation of social norms depends crucially on the agent being observed by others.  The 
anticipation of being observed may cause her to abstain from the norm-violating behavior or to 
hide it carefully.  Actually being observed may trigger one of the action tendencies of shame: 
hide, run away, or kill oneself. 
Elster believes that the experience of shame is a crucial component in the mechanism 
sustaining social norms.  However, these emotions are triggered by the violation of norms 
and, hence, Elster is not telling us much about the phenomenology of conforming to 
norms. 
By contrast, the view I am suggesting has something to say about what it is like for an 
agent to act in accordance with an internalized norm because of an OLM: the question 
whether or not to obey a certain social norm does not arise for an agent influenced by an 
OLM.  From a first-personal perspective the norm-conforming character of the agent’s way 
of deliberating and acting is invisible.  Hence, the agent does not feel forced to comply 
with the norm.  I think this description is true to the typical phenomenology of complying 
with internalized social norms. 
This is not a merely negative claim about the phenomenology.  It implies a contrast: 
conforming to a norm because of an OLM differs phenomenologically from other cases of 
norm compliance in that it is invisible from the subject’s perspective. 
It may seem that other accounts can tell a similar story.  For anyone who countenances 
unconscious mental states can draw a distinction between consciously conforming to a 
norm and unconsciously doing so.  My response to this brings me to the fourth and final 
point. 
(iv)  According to the OLM Hypothesis, norm adherence can be explained by a 
subpersonal, unconscious mechanism, and the behavior can still be the result of complex, 
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conscious deliberation.  This result goes beyond, e.g., Bicchieri’s distinction between a 
heuristic and a deliberational route to norm adherence (Bicchieri 2006, p. 5).  For 
according to the OLM Hypothesis, an agent can go through tedious, explicit, conscious 
deliberation and still be under the influence of an OLM; the agent simply does not see the 
excluded options. 
7. Objections 
I now want to consider five possible objections against the view I am suggesting. 
Objection (i):  OLMs are a completely general phenomenon and have nothing to do 
with social norms.  Answer:  I agree that something like OLMs play important roles in 
domains that have nothing to do with social norms, e.g., in expert decision making (see 
Section 4.1 above).  Moreover, there are cases of norm compliance that have nothing to do 
with OLMs.  This does not mean, however, that OLMs never explain norm compliance, as 
the OLM Hypothesis says. 
An analogy may help to bring this out.  I sometimes follow a social norm because 
doing so pleases my partner.  This means neither that whenever I follow a norm, I do so 
because it pleases my partner nor that whenever I do something because it pleases my 
partner, I am following a norm.  Nevertheless, what explains my norm compliance in said 
cases is that I want to please my partner.  An exactly parallel situation is common for norm 
compliance because of OLMs.  Sometimes I follow a norm because the existence of the 
norm in my society has led to a mechanism that systematically excludes norm-violating 
options from my deliberation.  This is not in conflict with the idea that I am sometimes 
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able to make expert decisions because my experience has led to a mechanism that 
systematically excludes options that are unlikely to result in good outcomes from my 
deliberation.  Nor does this mean that this is the only way in which I can come to follow a 
norm.  The situation is structurally identical to the situation with the wishes of my partner. 
Moreover, we should not ignore OLMs when we want to understand phenomena like 
social-expressive norm violations.  After all, these are very special phenomena and the 
specific mechanisms that underlie certain cases of norm violation can make a difference 
here — or so I argued above.  Without the OLM Hypothesis we couldn’t say that social-
expressive norm violations can work by putting an option on the table that was previously 
systematically neglected. 
Objection (ii):  There is evidence that people do not follow social norms if they believe 
that other people do not follow them either (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009; Nolan et al. 2008).  
It might seem that my view is not compatible with this because OLMs exclude options 
unconditionally.  Answer:  As explained above, if someone expects that others will violate 
a norm (as interpreted by the OLM-triggering schema), she will no longer follow the norm 
because of an OLM (though she might continue to comply because of some other factor).  
For if the agent expects others to violate the norm, she can consider the option of violating 
the norm herself. 
One might worry that this makes OLMs too fragile to sustain social norms.  In 
response, I want to point out four things:  First, it is plausible that OLMs typically work in 
tandem with motivational factors that help to sustain the OLMs.  Second, there actually are 
norms that are hardly ever violated in public (e.g. licking one’s plate after dinner); in such 
cases, corresponding OLMs can be sustained easily.  Third, since OLMs depend on 
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schemata, it is possible to observe a norm-violation without this interfering with the OLM 
if the norm-violation is not interpreted in terms of the OLM triggering schema.  Fourth, it 
is actually the relative fragility of OLMs that makes social-expressive norm violations very 
effective in cases where a norm is mostly followed because of an OLM and not because of 
a particular motivation to comply with the norm. 
Objection (iii):  An opponent might think that my explanation of social-expressive 
norm violations really only works for conventions and not for genuine social norms.  After 
all, social norms are often distinguished from conventions on the basis that acting in 
accordance with a convention furthers the narrowly conceived self-interest of the agent (as 
long as everyone else also follows the convention), while this is not so for social norms.  
“Conventions do not run counter to selfish motives, but social norms often do” (Bicchieri 
2006, p. 44).  An opponent might think that this implies that violations of norms always 
make someone other than the agent worse off, while this is not so for conventions.  
Violating norms of fairness, e.g., typically makes someone other than the agent worse off 
than she would otherwise be.  So, the opponent continues, norm violations will not trigger 
a public debate.  Rather, they will simply be met with accusations of selfishness.  Hence, 
the OLM account is implausible for genuine norms.24 
In response to this worry, I want to point out two problems with this objection.  The 
first one is that the distinction between norms and conventions does not imply that 
violating a norm always makes someone else worse off, while going against a convention 
never does so.  In many countries where people drive on the right side of the street it is a 
convention that pedestrians ceteris paribus pass each other on their left sides.  This is a 
                                                 
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry. 
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typical convention in that no one could gain anything be violating the convention; it’s a 
Nash Equilibrium.  Notice, however, I not only making myself worse off by violating the 
convention, I also make other people worse off.  After all, I bump into them.  Conversely, 
there are norms whose violations don’t hurt anyone.  There once was, e.g., a genuine norm 
to show up to a duel if someone “requested satisfaction.”  However, you didn’t make 
anyone worse off by not showing up to the duel.  Thus, the objection rests on an 
implication that simply does not hold. 
The opponent might grant this logical point but still hold that the OLM Hypothesis can 
only explain norm violations that don’t make anyone worse off than she would otherwise 
be.  However, this doesn’t seem right.  Here is an example:  In many countries where 
spending some time in the military is compulsory, there is a social norm to serve one’s 
time in the military.  And we can easily imagine that, for many, violating this norm is not 
an option they deliberate about — and this is so because of an OLM.  Spending time in the 
military simply seems to these people to be a natural part of their lives.  It’s “what one 
does.”  This creates the conditions under which pacifists might try to shake up society by 
publically refusing to join the military.  Arguably, these pacifists make everyone else 
worse off because the nation will have to get by without their military service.  Here the 
OLM account can explain norm violations that make people other than the agent worse off.  
In general, the OLM account can even explain social-expressive norm violations that put a 
particular group at a disadvantage, relative to the situation without the norm violation, if 
the agents think that there is a reasonable chance that many people will doubt that the 
group has a right to the benefits that accrue to them because of the norm.  So the objection 
fails.  Nevertheless, I acknowledge that typical agents who engage in social-expressive 
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norm violations will make sure that they are not perceived as selfish.  But this doesn’t 
undermine my account. 
Objection (iv):  We sometimes act without deliberation out of a habit.  Can habit — 
perhaps in conjunction with motivation — do all the explanatory work that the concept of 
an OLM can do?  Answer:  Note that cases of norm compliance that are explained by 
OLMs can be the result of complicated deliberation.  I can make intricate plans about my 
behavior during a job interview, e.g., without ever considering many ways in which I could 
violate social norms during the interview.  In such cases, my behavior is neither simply 
habitual nor does it necessarily maximize my chances of getting the job (perhaps certain 
norm violations would be well-received).  Maybe an opponent would reply that what is at 
issue is not a habit of acting a certain way but a habit of deliberating a certain way.  Such a 
view would be very close to my own view.  There are two important differences, however.  
First, on my view, a social norm is a crucial factor in bringing about the OLM.  If the 
“habit” arose in some other way, this would not be a case in which the behavior is 
influenced by a social norm.  Second, the OLM Hypothesis says that there is a mechanism 
that makes the subject systematically blind to norm-violating options.  Thus, if the OLM 
Hypothesis is correct, it should be harder to alert someone to an option that is excluded 
from deliberation because of an OLM than to an option that merely goes against the 
agent’s habits. 
Objection (v):  It might seem that OLMs cannot apply to proscriptive norms; for such 
norms make the option of violating the norm salient by explicitly mentioning it.  Answer:  
Since OLMs are subpersonal, unconscious mechanisms, the subject need not be aware of 
any formulation of the norm that she follows because of an OLM.  It may be difficult to 
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create an OLM for a proscriptive norm in someone else.  One way in which this might 
happen is that such norms are translated into constraints on attaining norm-independent 
goals, e.g.: you should try to reach your goals in a fair way.  In this way, the upshot of the 
norm “Don’t be unfair” can be formulated without mentioning the option of being unfair. 
8. Conclusion 
I have described cases of social-expressive norm violations, and I have argued that realistic 
interpretations of some prominent recent accounts of social norms don’t give us much 
insight into such cases.  If we accept the OLM Hypothesis and assume that people 
sometimes adhere to norms because they are systematically blind to norm-violating 
options, this helps us to understand social-expressive norm violations.  The OLM 
hypothesis is independently plausible and has some interesting consequences.  In 
particular, it highlights the importance of cognition in norm adherence.  Moreover, if the 
OLM Hypothesis is correct, many experimental paradigms for investigating social norms 
have hitherto unnoticed shortcomings.  Given all this, I think that the OLM Hypothesis 
deserves to be taken seriously and to be investigated empirically. 
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